Broadway

Processes that I call ‘the reversion to realism’ and the transformation of the foreign constitute part of the history of the American theater.  Thorton Wilder’s Our Town absorbed the Brechtian strategies of defamiliarization in a sentimentalized form that makes these aesthetic techniques serve realism rather than contend with it.  Ironically, the familiar codes of realistic American drama do not derive from perceptions of American experience but, with few exceptions, rework schemes of representation that developed in Europe to model the transitions in European society at the end of the nineteenth century and were outdated early in the twentieth.

Late-nineteenth-century realism developed in reaction to the limited ideologies and aesthetic structures of the European commercial theater; now, well into the twenty first century, I find utterly unsatisifying the attenuated, fossilized imitation of Ibsenian and Chekhovian realism as the basic mode of the American commercial theater….

Because plays, films, and television train and re-train audiences to accept the psychological, sociological, economic, biological, and aesthetic conventions in which late-nineteenth-century writers and producers configured their sense of the real, realism remains the form in which American audiences are most comfortable.

Sadly, the logistics of the Broadway theater discourage writing that departs from realism.  It appropriates its own innovative artists by leading them away from experiment into the reactionary codes of dramatic realism.

The Dead End of Representation

The reality that representation imitates
is itself a representation
so that is why
mimetic narratives are dead ends
because they are images of images.

a.  theatricality of theater.

b.  the painterliness of paint.

c.  the movement and time of dance.

d.  the audio impulse of music

Why is it that so many
seem to want to make virtual reality
a representational field. 
Why not explore it as what it is:
a field of play. 
Let’s make VR polymorphous. 
Discover what’s inherent in the medium itself
then let that work itself out.

a.  What is inherent in the medium:  potential of interactivity, kinesthetic, telepresence (being present at a distance:  in vr you are always at two places at once, you are present in real space and virtual space, re to telepathic, within its use the operator has the potential to assume a subjectivity other than the subjectivity she/he may perform in real experience.  With VR, gender, ethnicity, class, educational status is transitory and volatile.

b.  What would a virtual audience be.  A reconfigured configuration of spectator.  If the spectator is within the art object, interactively, what has this to do with Aristotle and the implied separation of spectator and protagonist with whom the spectator identifies but only up to a point, maintaining the integrity of the separation of the fictive world and the area in which the spectator sits, watching and listening.

If the operator is partaking in narrative formation,
what she/he is doing
is calling up existing narrative formations,
this is what people do. 
What would be interesting
is the analysis of those narrative choices
the ways in which those narrative choices
construct the subjectivity of the operator/spectator.
Isn’t all aesthetic formulations and reconfiguartions
an attempt to establish an image of the subject for the subject?

The goal of the avnat-garde has been to reject the above notion and employ an art for it’s own sake.
Art for Art.

Fredric Jameson: “cognitive mapping”

Fredric Jameson’s discourse on “cognitive mapping”,
in my opinion,
forms a brilliant, seductive, intellectual web.

He captures the slippery and elusive
proliferation of images
in the postmodernist work
and figures them in a design
authored by the production modes of late capitalism.
While the design is not specifically authored
–that is by a subject—
and the design does not consist of languages
that hold specific, unequivocal referents,
a design,
however openly suggested and provocatively diffused,
remains a design,
an imposition of a map upon a territory.

I don’t make maps,
cognitive or otherwise,
I prefer to not establish boundaries,
avoid territorial claims,
or promote or deny immigration/emigration.

Map-making is always a political act—
disguised as the search for knowledge.

I read Jameson’s analysis of the Gehry house
an attempt either to control my perception
of that site or its photographs.
He infuses his perception into my perception;
and his analysis of Alien NATION
in which the aesthetic artifact
remains outside of the reader’s range of vision
a reification of the object
only in his terms.

The cleverness of his rhetorical strategy:

“For the reader this [the video itself] will remain an imaginary text; but the reader need not ‘imagine’ that the spectator is in an altogether different situation” (79).

As with the map,
I see the cognitive chart,
not the actual territory as mass:
the simulacrum
not the geography
itself experienced as
the traversing of space in time.

I fear that this process
constitutes a kind of
aesthetic totalitarianism.

I prefer an image of
a treasure map
allowing me to dig
but defers my discovery of the treasure infinitely.
Within my strategy,
one can continue to shovel it….

False Art

Why go grubbing in muck heaps?
The world is fair,
and the proportion of healthy-minded men
and honest women to those that are foul,
fallen and unnatural, is great.
Mr Oscar Wilde has again
been writing stuff that were better unwritten;
and while The Picture of Dorian Gray,
which he contributes to Lippincott’s is
ingenious, interesting, full of cleverness,
and plainly the work of a man of letters,
it is false art –
for its interest is medico-legal;
it is false to human nature –
for its hero is a devil;
it is false to morality –
for it is not made sufficiently clear
that the writer does not prefer
a course of unnatural iniquity
to a life of cleanliness,
health and sanity.

Charles Whibley’s review of The Portrait of Dorian Gray in The Scots Observer (5th July 1890)

Wilde’s response:
“Your reviewer suggests
that I do not make it sufficiently clear
whether I prefer virtue to wickedness
or wickedness to virtue.
An artist, sir,
has no ethical sympathies at all.
Virtue and wickedness
are to him simply
what the colours on his palette are to the painter.
They are no more,
and they are no less.
He sees that by their means
a certain artistic effect can be produced
and he produces it.
Iago may be morally horrible
and Imogen stainlessly pure.
Shakespeare, as Keats said,
had as much delight in creating the one
as he had in creating the other.”

Oscar Wilde, letter to the newspapers editor, William Ernest Henley (July 1890)